Monday, July 23, 2018

Change to National Service Policy

This is my suggestion for a change in our National Service policy:

a) Reduce the training period to 8 to 12 months.
b) All officers should be full time.
c) Reservist training should be called every two years and be for 3 days duration. The aim is to refresh on the use of weapons.
d) In the event of hostility, the reservists can be called up for intensive training.
e) An adequate allowance should be paid for the time of the conscripts and reservists.

I think that this is a more effective use of our military budget. We can still maintain a credible citizen army without paying too much and imposing too big a sacrifice on the citizens.

Tan Kin Lian

http://tklcloud.com/Conv/feedback2.aspx?id=144

3 comments:

W.K. said...

As much as what many would perceive as a toll, National Service as a foundation national institution is essential. The last 18mths of Trump presidency demonstrated how fragile geopolitical strategic calculus can change, and we should not take security for granted. Nevertheless NS need to be reform to stay relevant, but it should be in the quality of our NS programme more than just cutting time. NS should be structured so that our full-time/regular servicemen are able to extract transferable skills, for example SAF can collaborate with education institutions and private sectors to incorporate accredited professional certifications in areas like project management, 6-sigma, or specialized skills such as cyber-security, mechanics, etc. Such programmes will ensure that the 2yrs spent are not useful take-away. Extending from there, a more conducive environment wherein NSF can undertake part-time/modular studies contributing towards their course of future studies, potentially this can help NSF (enrolled into local universities) accelerate their learning. In terms of talent pool, we should be more inclusive than exclusive, and recognize leadership and high-calibre individuals from both regular, NSF, NS reservists, and potential SAFVC as well, in fact I think we should expand NS to female Singaporeans (albeit for a shorten period of 1yr) so that we can field more resources for non-combat or support roles. The burden of national defense can be more equitably distributed with an enlarged support base than smaller. Competency of reservist should be maintained at a high-level, but we should explore how this can be made less taxing, for example IPT/RT/IPPT can be structured to be provided by private gyms or that personal fitness activities can be attributed to partial fulfillment of IPT/RT/IPPT on a point-based systems, weapon handling/range can be conducted at SAFRA electronic shooting range - in a nutshell componentization and gamification of the entire readiness framework.

Yujuan said...

NS is not to protect our red dot, just a deterrent to buy some time before friendly foreign help arrives. It's a fallacy that MINDEF could protect us.
Our SAF has never gone on a battle yet since conception, never even fire a single bullet yet on foreign soil. It's so top down kind of admin control that SAF would be in chaos should an enemy really invades. The disgraceful video going viral when our SPF ran off instead of staying put to control situation at the small Little India riot is a mirror to our defence capabilities.
All the sophisticated, expensive weaponry cannot compete with guerilla war tactics. Think the Vietnam War. Dun know how our young NS recruits are guerilla trained in the Brunei jungles, but Singapore is a concrete jungle, we can't even nab a limping terrorist, had to rely on Malaysian Police in Johore to catch him.
What's the criteria for NS, Reservice, etc., when comes to real action, our defence mechanism dun impress.
Also one missile from thousands of miles could easily flatten our concrete jungle with just one shot.
Be realistic about NS, time to come down from Ivory Tower, and stop living in the past, and make changes to keep up with the modern world.

Anonymous said...

I had the privilege to know a few senior saf commanders back in the late 1980s. That was the time when the entire saf had only a few BGs and a couple of major generals, one of which was Winston Choo. A handful of those senior commanders did see minor combat action during 1963-1965 in East Malaysia during konfrontasi, but as part of Malaysian army.

In the 1980s, defense against any attack from the south depended heavily on navy and airforce with aggressive attacks on enemy staging sites & army camps & airfields. Aim is to prevent mass landings of enemy forces. As long we had air superiority, any attack from South is going to be tough.

From the north, it was to be taking the fight to them i.e. invasion & fighting in JB itself. If enemy forces manage to get into S'pore in force, it's basically over.

The main aim is to break the enemy resolve or stalemate them for up to a month or so, before some UN intervention or 3rd party can help. S'pore doesn't have the depth n breadth to sustain any prolonged fighting.

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